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Dissonant sustainabilities? Politicising and psychologising 
antagonisms in the conservation-development nexus  
 
Sian Sullivan1  
 
Abstract. 
Reflecting on more than twenty years engagement with the idea that development and economic 
growth are essential for ensuring environmental conservation and sustainability, a key experience for 
me has been that of dissonance. In this talk I draw on the concept of ‘dissonance’ as explored some 
decades ago by psychologist Leon Festinger in A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957). I focus in 
particular on how the coherence of sustainability discourses can be maintained precisely by managing, 
and often excluding, contradictory information, however robustly argued and evidenced that 
information might be. My intention is to highlight ways in which this management of dissonance is 
also ideological in nature, with implications for understanding the antagonisms with which 
sustainability discourse is infused. 
 
Key words. cognitive dissonance; sustainability; conservation and development; Namibia; CBNRM; 
conservancies; trophy hunting; biodiversity offsetting; blockchain technology; cryptocurrencies; 
ideology  
 
 
1. Introduction2  
In more than twenty years engagement with the idea that development and economic growth 
are essential for ensuring environmental conservation and sustainability, a key experience for 
me has been that of dissonance. I will explain in more detail below what I mean by ‘dissonant 
sustainabilities’ in the title of this paper. In brief, however, an example might be the frequent 
disconnection between public narratives of integrated conservation and development 
outcomes in west Namibia with observed patterns and voiced impacts in specific 
circumstances ‘on the ground’. Another example might be the idea that development impacts 
on habitats in places can be satisfactorily offset or exchanged through purchase of quantified 
biodiversity units to be established in the future somewhere else. I discuss both these 
examples in more detail below. 
 
In this paper, I take the experiential phenomena of dissonance as a matter of concern in itself. 
Some questions I’ll be asking are: 
 
• How do social scientists and humanities scholars engaging with the conservation-and-
development nexus understand and manage the dissonance we frequently face in our 
research?  
                                                
1 s.sullivan@bathspa.ac.uk  
2 This paper was first presented as a keynote lecture at the conference The Politics of Sustainability: Rethinking 
Resources, Values and Justice, organised by the Finnish Society of Development Research in Helsinki, 14-16 
February 2018 (see http://www.kehitystutkimus.fi/conference/). 
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• How do we manage how others might manage the dissonance that our work may 
generate for them?  
 
• How do we continue to embrace the opportunities for learning about difference that 
are part and parcel of our methodologies, when this learning might itself generate 
significant cognitive dissonance for us as researchers? This question relates in 
particular to social anthropology, a discipline that through field research in frequently 
unfamiliar geographical and cultural contexts makes a virtue of the attempt to make 
what is strange familiar and what is familiar strange (for example, Malinowski 1922; 
Eriksen 2001; see discussion in Sullivan 2016a, 2017a); and in doing so fully 
celebrates rather than polices the different ‘truths’ through which people bring their 
worlds into being.  
 
• But conversely, how do we remain sane and grounded in a present moment of 
‘alternative facts’, ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth politics’, in which dissonance regarding 
what is understood to be true seems to be the political order of the day (regarding this 
point specifically, see discussion in Sullivan 2017a: 232-235).  
 
In framing these questions like this, I am drawing on the concept of ‘dissonance’ in the sense 
proposed some decades ago by American psychologist Leon Festinger in A Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance (1957). In the next section I will outline some key dimensions of this 
theory and begin to indicate some ways in which I think it is useful for understanding the 
politics of sustainability.  
 
 
2. On Cognitive Dissonance 
The starting point of the theory of cognitive dissonance is that ‘we do not like inconsistency. 
It upsets us and it drives us to reduce [whatever we are experiencing as] inconsistency’ 
(Cooper 2007: 2). Indeed, the theory proposes that ‘the greater the inconsistency we face, the 
more agitated we will be and the more motivated we will be to reduce it’ (ibid.). This means 
that we will engage in various strategies to reduce, rather than amplify, the experience of 
dissonance (Festinger 1957: 18). Some of these strategies may take rather artful or perhaps 
unexpected, even pathological, forms – an aspect to which I return in more detail below.  
 
The theory asserts that the inconsistency being dealt with is cognitive. It is focused on the 
(in)consistency or dissonance/consonance between what Festinger thought of as ‘elements of 
knowledge’: ‘pieces of knowledge’ someone might hold about reality. The theory proposes 
that a state of psychological dissonance arises when two cognitive elements are inconsistent 
with each other. An example might be the psychological dissonance or tension that arises 
when a person performs actions that are incongruent with their beliefs. Clearly this sort of 
situation arises often. For example, it is perhaps dissonant that I developed this paper for a 
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conference on environmental sustainability to which I flew from the UK, even though I am 
concerned about the contributions of CO23 emissions to anthropogenic climate change and its 
negative implications for the sustenance of a familiarly livable global environment.  
 
On this point, the theory proposes further that the magnitude of dissonance increases in 
relation to the value of mismatching elements. This aspect, of course, is extremely important 
when thinking about the environmental consequences of economic development choices. 
How, for example, do I arrive at an experience of cognitive consonance when I learn that no 
net loss of biodiversity will arise through strategies to offset the impacts on species and 
habitats caused by major infrastructure or extractive developments, if this proposition is 
entirely dissonant with all my understandings of ecological processes and dynamics? Again, I 
will return to this example below. The cognitive dimension of dissonance becomes 
increasingly complex when taking seriously the sometimes very different conceptions or 
knowledges people have regarding the nature of being, and especially the sources of agency 
in the world, affirmed in anthropological research regarding the diverse culturenature 
ontologies through which people understand and make their worlds (for example, Griaule 
1975[1947]; Hallowell 1961; Taussig 2010[1980]; Descola and Pàlsson 1996; Viveiros de 
Castro 2004, 2013; Blaser 2013; Descola 2013; Sullivan 2013, 2016a; Holbraad et al. 2014; 
Burman 2017; for circumstances in west Namibia specifically see Sullivan 2017a and Hannis 
and Sullivan in press). As Festinger (1957: 14) observes, what is dissonant or consonant 
varies culturally. 
 
Finally, the theory proposes that situations of cognitive dissonance require management so as 
to reduce the psychological stress generated by the dissonance. In the personal case I mention 
above, I might have all sorts of ways of rationalising my air-travel to a conference on 
sustainability so as to reduce the dissonance between my beliefs and my actions. For example, 
I might think that it is more important overall to have a platform from which to share my 
concerns with a wider audience. I might in particular rationalise that I want to be able to do 
what I can to support younger scholars who may be encountering the sorts of confusion I have 
experienced through the experience of dissonance in the contexts in which I have worked. 
Such a rationalisation does not remove the dissonance between my actions and beliefs, but it 
does help to bring the different and dissonant elements of cognition closer together, and 
thereby to reduce the state of tension associated with the discordance between them. An 
additional way of managing dissonance that we all do to varying extents is to engage in forms 
of confirmation bias, i.e. seeking out information that confirms, rather than disproves, a belief 
we already hold. 
 
 
                                                
3 Acronyms: BDO – biodiversity offsetting; CBNRM – Community-Based Natural Resources Management; CO2 – 
carbon dioxide; MET – Ministry of Environment and Tourism; NACSO – Namibian Association of CBNRM Support 
Organisations; NAE – Natural Asset Exchange; NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation; NNF – Namibian Nature 
Foundation; TEEB – The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity; WAVES – Wealth Accounting and Valuation of 
Ecosystem Services 
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Festinger goes further, however, by observing that the ways in which a person or group of 
people maintain the coherence of their beliefs is often through the active exclusion of 
information contradictory to those beliefs, however robustly evidenced that information might 
be. Festinger had previously – and famously – explored in detail a situation in which a group 
of people managed cognitive dissonance not by changing perceptions in the wake of 
disconfirming information, but by finding ways to strengthen commitment to their original 
belief. This case is worth outlining in some detail.  
 
In the early 1950s colleagues of Festinger conducted covert research which led to 
membership of a group which understood that the end of the world would take place at 
midnight on 21st Dec 1954 (Festinger et al. 1956). In following the messages from an alien 
planet received by a Michigan woman through automatic writing, they ‘had left their homes, 
jobs and partners and given away their possessions in order to be ready for the arrival of a 
flying saucer that would rescue them from the doomed planet’ (Gray 2013: 72).  
 
Festinger and his team wished to observe what the group would do in the face of the 
disconfirming evidence that would surely arise when the end of the world did not in fact 
happen. A rational perspective would perhaps predict that the group would change their 
beliefs in the wake of the disconfirming evidence, i.e. in the wake of exposure to the fact that 
the end of the world did not take place. In fact, however, and as predicted by Festinger and his 
team, the opposite occurred. The group reduced the dissonance between their beliefs and the 
fact that the end of the world did not take place by strengthening their beliefs. They did this 
through incorporating new supporting and confirming information, and through seeking social 
support by becoming increasingly public about their beliefs. Specifically, ‘they interpreted the 
failure of doomsday to arrive as evidence that by waiting and praying throughout the night in 
question they had succeeded in preventing it’ (Gray 2013: 73). In doing so, they were able to 
emerge even more convinced of the truth of their beliefs.   
 
A present-day version of this sort of scenario is embodied by the Flat-Earth Society denying 
that the recent space-launch by billionaire businessman Elon Musk proves that the earth is a 
sphere (see, for example, Graham 2018). They instead deploy various arguments to maintain 
that the launch itself was a hoax and that there is nothing about the footage released from the 
launch to demonstrate the spherical nature of the earth.  
 
The implication of these and other cases is that people will work harder to reduce cognitive 
dissonance by strengthening their beliefs, than by rationally changing their beliefs in the face 
of disconfirming evidence. Indeed, the theory predicts that when we are invested in a given  
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perspective we will expend great effort to justify retaining the challenged perspective4, even 
when – perhaps especially when – confronted with disconfirming evidence.  
 
This, I think, is both a troubling and an illuminating observation. It is troubling because it 
suggests that a humanist assumption of rationality leading to incremental progress might itself 
be a belief that is dissonant with observed reality. Indeed, we only have to look around at 
some of the key events of the contemporary moment to see how collectively we seem to be 
regressing rather than ‘progressing’ on varying fronts. On this point I am turning to the book 
The Silence of Animals: On Progress and Other Modern Myths by philosopher John Gray 
(2013), which in fact was the text that led me back to the work of Festinger on cognitive 
dissonance. Gray argues that the idea of incremental progress based on the observation that 
people will consistently change their beliefs in relation to facts that appear to be true, is itself 
a myth. He writes that although ‘[r]ational humanity shows no sign of ever arriving’, 
‘humanists cling more fervently to the conviction that humankind will someday be redeemed 
from unreason’, interpreting the non-event as confirmation of their faith (Gray 2013: 80-81). 
This situation leads Gray (2013: 75) to assert that ‘[i]f there is anything unique about the 
human animal it is that it has the ability to grow knowledge at an accelerating rate while being 
chronically incapable of learning from experience’.  
 
This is one troubling aspect of the observation that cognitive dissonance is often managed by 
holding on to cherished beliefs, even in the face of disconfiming evidence. But the 
illuminating aspect – the one that perhaps in fact offers us more freedom – is to take more 
fully on board that we are managing dissonance all the time in a dynamic world in which 
‘truths’ are negotiated rather than found or fixed. We are bombarded continually, and with 
increasing intensity, by diametrically opposed narratives and messages regarding the world. 
Somehow we have to navigate a way through this complexity in order to remain sane (as 
captured in the cartoon in Fig. 1), by which I mean achieving enough psychological 
consonance between diverse elements of knowledge in order to be able to function and act in 
the world. Bringing awareness and reflexivity to the processes through which we all do this 
can perhaps assist with understanding sources and experiences of dissonance in the politics of 
sustainability, as well as offering different possibilities for acting in the world. 
 
                                                
4 There are echoes here with Thomas Kuhn’s (1970[1962]: ix, 1) historical analysis of the ways in which scientific 
knowledge building, through the striving of individual scientists, tends towards the production of relatively stable 
constellations of ‘facts, theories, and methods’ that become normative and paradigmatic, but which are susceptible to 
revolutionary ‘shifts’ towards a different constellation whenever there are sustained ‘violations of expectation’. 
Kuhn’s work demonstrates the constructed and contingent nature of scientific objects in the ‘hardest’ of sciences, as 
well as the simultaneously conservative nature of much scientific practice (i.e. in working to sustain accepted 
paradigms), and the tendency of scientific paradigms to experience crises that encourage ‘paradigm shifts’.  
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Figure 1.  
  
Source: http://howtosavetheworld.ca/images/sipress-cognitive-dissonance.jpg, accessed 11 February 2018. 
 
 
In the next section I draw on the theory of cognitive dissonance to consider some ways in 
which the coherence of particular conservation and development discourses is managed 
through excluding, discounting and sometimes capitalising on contradictory information. My 
concern is to highlight that the management of dissonance is also ideological in nature, acting 
to bolster specific patterns of privilege and inequality that other perspectives might 
understand as detrimental for the flourishing of biocultural diversity. 
 
 
3. On Dissonant Sustainabilities 
 
1. Managing disconfirming evidence 
My starting point here arises from a recent experience that in fact links Finland – where I 
gave the talk on which this paper is based – to an area in west Namibia in which I have 
conducted research since the early 1990s. The place is called Sorris Sorris and it is roughly 
marked by the blue asterisk on Figs. 2 and 3. Whilst in Namibia in October 2017, I attended a 
public lecture that concerned Sorris Sorris, given by the NGO the Namibian Nature 
Foundation (NNF), described as ‘Namibia’s leading conservation and sustainable 
development organisation’5. The talk, entitled ‘Hunting for opportunities: promoting business 
and employment for communal conservancies’ and presented at the Franco-Namibian 
Cultural Centre in Windhoek on 5 October 2017, focused on the establishment of a new 
model of commercial ‘non-trophy hunting’ – framed additionally as ‘conservation hunting’ – 
                                                
5 See http://www.nnf.org.na/, accessed 12 February 2018. 
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supported by Finnish development aid-funding through the Finnish Embassy’s Fund for Local 
Cooperation6.  
 
Namibia is well-known for its Community-Based Natural Resources Management programme 
– or CBNRM – which seeks to promote both conservation and development through opening 
landscapes and wildlife to new sources of entrepreneurial private investment in tourism and 
hunting. CBNRM has become established on top of the pattern of land control set up during 
Namibia’s colonial and later apartheid history, as depicted in Fig. 3. Most of the central and 
southern parts of the country were surveyed, fenced and settled by commercial white farmers 
once indigenous peoples – other than those that became labourers in commercial farming 
areas – had been constrained to more marginal areas, coloured green in Fig. 3a. It is these 
remaining communally-managed areas that have been the focus of CBNRM. The primary 
organisational outcome of CBNRM in Namibia has been the establishment of locally-run 
resource management organisations called conservancies – which again are coloured green on 
the right-hand map. Conservancies are described in part as organisations established to enable 
business, the premise being that it is through business that both conservation and 
conservation-related development will arise. A recent report of the Namibian Association of 
CBNRM Support Organisations thus states that a conservancy is ‘a business venture in 
communal land use… although its key function is actually to enable business’; such that 
conservancies therefore ‘do not necessarily need to run any of the business ventures that use 
the resources themselves. In fact, these are often best controlled and carried out by private 
sector operators with the necessary know-how and market linkages’ (NACSO 2014: 25).  
 
One of the key ways in which conservancies can enter into business arrangements with 
private sector investors is through agreements with commercial hunting operators (Naidoo et 
al. 2016). Indeed, hunting tourism is promoted as a primary means of generating income for 
conservancy management structures and members, through the payment of fees by 
professional private hunting operators. Naidoo et al. (2016: 628) assert, for example, that for 
detailed financial accounting data from 2011-2013 ‘… the main benefits from [trophy] 
hunting were income for conservancy management and food in the form of meat for the 
community at large’; calculating the economic value of ‘wild meat distributed from animals 
that were hunted’ as ‘the price of buying alternative meat’, i.e. ‘replacement cost shadow 
price approach’. Using this method of creating equivalence between different kinds of meat, 
Naidoo et al. (2016: 632) suggest that ‘a substantial fraction [of the benefits from trophy 
hunting as commercial enterprises in communal area conservancies] went to the community at 
large in the form of meat from hunted animals’, with approximately 1.4 million kg of meat 
equating to 32.0% of calculated benefits. 
                                                
6 See http://www.nnf.org.na/index.php/projects.html#hunting-for-opportunities-promoting-business-and-employment-
for-communal-conservancies, last accessed 30 March 2018. Nb. Online references were last accessed on 30 March, 
unless otherwise stated. 
 8 
Figure 2. Locating Sorris Sorris in west Namibia (marked by the blue asterisk). 
 
 
Source: https://www.futurepasts.net/west-namibia, accessed 17 March 2018. 
 
Figure 3. Pattern of land control in Namibia: a) showing areas under private and communal tenure (the 
flesh and green coloured areas respectively); b) showing the area now administered as communal area 
conservancies. The blue asterix indicates the location of the Sorris Sorris Conservancy. 
 
 
Land allocation and tenure in Namibia. Source: ACACIA Project E1 2007 online http://www.uni-
koeln.de/sfb389/e/e1/download/atlas_namibia/pics/land_history/control-over-land.jpg; b) Registered communal area conservancies, state 
protected areas and tourism concession areas in Namibia, as of 2014. Source: NACSO, Windhoek, online 
http://www.nacso.org.na/resources/conservancies-map-a3. 
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A current emphasis on income generation through commercial trophy hunting, however, 
makes Namibian CBNRM vulnerable to global concerns regarding the ethics of trophy 
hunting. Negative perceptions of trophy hunting in Africa have been heightened in the wake 
of the Cecil the Lion controversy in 2015 when, with a professional Zimbabwean hunting-
operator, a wealthy American hunter in Zimbabwe killed an elderly research lion named 
‘Cecil’. This event precipitated a veritable social media storm from which Namibian trophy 
hunting has not been immune7. That this situation is provocative for the promotion of 
commercial trophy hunting as a means of ensuring income streams in association with 
communal area conservancies is indicated by the time spent by the NNF presenter in the 
October talk on denouncing, rather than engaging, international public concerns regarding the 
topic of trophy hunting in Namibia. Without taking ‘sides’ in this emotive debate, it is 
pertinent to note here that strategies of denouncement rather than dialogue (from both sides) 
are themselves ways of managing dissonance so as to sustain a particular perspective on the 
right route towards integrated conservation and development in this context. 
 
The value for conservancies of various forms of commercial hunting was thus a major theme 
in the NNF talk. The NNF-Finnish ‘conservation hunting’ or ‘non-trophy hunting’ initiative 
seeks instead to diversify from trophy hunting per se, so as to raise the economic value of 
animal off-take quotas approved for a conservancy’s ‘own use’ and ‘shoot and sell’8 (as 
opposed to trophies)9, through enhancing entrepreneurial access to these animals. The talk 
focused largely on the ways that Finnish funding has been used in Sorris Sorris to promote 
two types of commercial ‘non-trophy hunting’10. The first is a professional package that is run 
by a commercial operator in Namibia called Estreux Safaris11. This is itself a business 
established through the historical appropriation of land in central Namibia (as shown in Fig. 
3a) that has contributed to the poverty and constrained opportunities that many recipients in 
communal area conservancies struggle with. The second hunting package is described as a 
‘premium hunting concept’ that would involve self-driving by experienced hunters sourced 
through the Finnish Hunting Association12. Finnish hunters are known for appreciating a 
similarly extreme environment and for an emphasis on tracking and stalking on foot, and have 
visited Sorris Sorris in pilot hunts to explore ‘community conservation hunting’ in this 
conservancy. In this endeavour the meat that is not eaten by the hunters would be distributed 
                                                
7 See, for example, Reuters 2015. For a consideration of perceptions regarding the auctioning of permits to hunt 
endangered black rhino specifically in Namibia, see Hannis (2016). 
8 Wherein conservancies are able to trade animals in contracts to commercial butchers from outside the conservancy, 
with the approval of officers of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) (Bollig 2016).  
9 As Bollig (2016: 792-793) reviews, ‘[c]onservancies receive annual game quotas. These are set in annual meetings in 
which conservancy members, officers of the MET, NGO staff, and also trophy-hunting companies participate. About 
20% of the quota is designated for trophy hunting, whereas 80% is kept for own-use hunting ... The latter category 
consists of animals assigned to traditional authorities to furnish meetings with meat, animals traded in shoot-and-sell 
contracts to butchers from the wider region, and animals exchanged with local agencies for their services’. Regarding 
trophy animals, ‘[t]rophy hunters, or more often their helpers, usually only cut off the “trophy part” of the animal that 
has been shot. The meat is left with the community for distribution’. 
10 See http://www.nnf.org.na/project/hunting-for-opportunities-promoting-business-and-employment-for-communal-
conservancies/15/32/71.html, accessed 11 February 2018. 
11 See http://www.estreuxsafaris.com/  
12 See https://metsastajaliitto.fi/ 
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to the community, and this would be a key method through which the community would 
benefit. The speaker also claimed that ‘what is really important [locally] is meat’ – given a 
context where protein is at a premium. Meat distribution, therefore, was framed in the NNF 
talk as ‘the link that people on the ground get from conservation’. 
 
A problem for me is that I have heard this sort of multiple-win narrative over and over again 
and experience it as radically dissonant with local narratives I also hear over and over again. 
These latter narratives often say instead, for example, that people only occasionally acquire 
meat through conservancy activities, and certainly not enough to constitute a significant 
component of household diets. Indeed, not long after the NNF talk I gave a lift to a young 
man who lives in the Sorris Sorris conservancy who explained that all the meat seems to stay 
with the conservancy leadership and is only really available at the time of the annual game 
count13. He had been a volunteer on the last two game counts in Sorris Sorris – facilitated by 
the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) in March 2017, and January 2016. In these 
game counts this young man had laboured hard for several days, for which he had been paid 
in kind in the form of a feast of game meat when the count had been concluded (also see 
similar observations reported for this area in Silva and Mosimane 2012).  
 
This may seem like an incidental encounter but it in fact leads to a significant point regarding 
how the economic value of indigenous fauna is created in communal-area conservancy 
contexts, as well as where this value goes. The ability of a conservancy organisation to sell a 
permit for a private operator to hunt an animal is intricately linked with observations (e.g. 
‘counts’) recorded in event books as a central part of conservancy management by 
conservancy employees and members. Animals that can be hunted as either trophies or non-
trophies are thus ‘made’ through work by conservancy members to log observation 
information in event books etc. from which ‘surplus’ and/or ‘problem’ animals can be 
identified and potentially allocated as a part of the quota of animals that can be hunted in a 
season (Bollig 2016; Hewitson 2017; Schnegg and Kiaka in press). Professional hunting 
outfits pay a fee for their permit, a cost that is absorbed by their business through their 
charges to ‘tourist hunters’. So, another important measure here is the amount of profit made 
by professional hunters once their fees and other costs have been paid. How much is this in 
comparison with the income to the conservancy once conservancy costs (i.e. payments to staff 
for event book work, game counts etc.) have been covered? Recent research by Lee Hewitson 
(2017) on the creation and flow of monetary values and payments in relation to elephant 
trophy hunting in Kwandu Conservancy, Zambezi Region, demonstrates the limited 
disbursement of value to those local people whose labour creates the value of animals that 
become identified as potential trophies; showing too how fees become significantly 
concentrated amongst members of the conservancy elite and as profit to the commercial 
operator.  
 
                                                
13 Personal fieldnotes, 2017. 
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The same pattern seems to characterise conservancy-related income. Some people gain 
employment through conservancy-related commercial enterprises and this is clearly 
important. There is also some cash handout to conservancy members, but the amounts are 
mostly rather small and are not regular enough to be relied on as a significant part of 
household income. Some distribution of money from commercial tourism enterprises also 
goes towards conservancy running costs. What does seem certain, however, is that over the 
last 20 years conservancy establishment has created and supported a series of successful 
tourism and hunting enterprises run at a profit by private enterprises, through increased 
foreign tourism access and land areas zoned for wildlife, both of which impact on local 
livelihoods and autonomy (also see Silva and Mosimane 2012; Schnegg and Diaka in press), 
in part through intensifying human-wildlife conflicts (Sullivan 2016b).  
 
An additional layer in this diverging value creation is connected with technological change 
associated with internet banking. Unforeseen in the 1990s when Namibia’s CBNRM 
programme was being instigated and instituted, new communications technologies mean that 
payments to private operators of conservation enterprises can now be made from foreign bank 
accounts directly to other foreign bank accounts. This became apparent for me recently when 
I booked some accommodation in west Namibia in a lodge run under a private tourism 
concession through agreement with local communal area conservancies. The booking 
required a payment from my account in the UK into the Gibraltar International Bank14, 
begging the question of how much of this income from private conservation enterprise in 
communal areas Namibia actually sees in any form.  
 
The sort of dissonance arising here between claims and observations is often written about in 
development studies as the gap between ‘rhetoric and reality’ (see, for example, Hayter and 
Watson 1985; Park 1988; Okali 1994; Lind 2001; Mawere and Awuah-Nyamekye 2015). A 
key dimension, however, is also related to the active management of public narratives of 
success (Sullivan 2002: 179), undertaken in part to sustain access to funding sourced on the 
basis of the buoyancy of the conservation and development model being promoted. In the 
present case, given that the development model is an explicitly neoliberal one that requires 
development and conservation success to arise through various combinations of marketisation 
and private investment (Sullivan 2006), it is likely for evidence demonstrating that realities do 
not fully match public claims for wealth-sharing to be managed out of public discourse.  
 
One way of managing success in such contexts, then, is to delegitimise disconfirming 
evidence, which seems to be a dimension that is important to the conservation and 
development nexus. I have myself been subjected to attempts to close down publication of 
disconfirming evidence, through personal and legal threats and various attempts to prevent 
publication of research (discussed in Sullivan 2003). When this happened to me in the late 
1990s and early 2000s I was naively rather astonished. I had thought that sharing empirical 
                                                
14 Gibraltar is considered a tax haven – see Bullough 2017.  
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research findings showing something different to the rhetoric I was hearing (for example, 
Sullivan 1995) would simply add to possibilities of incorporating the information so as 
contribute to better outcomes. Over time, however, I came to realise that the sometimes 
‘disobedient knowledge’ generated by social scientists in relation to conservation contexts can 
become subject to various forms of rigorous management by organisations and funders in 
these circumstances – so much so that subsequently I joined with various social science 
researchers to share and problematise experiences of research suppression through a series of 
meetings15 and reports (for example, Igoe and Sullivan 2009). These initiatives contributed to 
the establishment of an advocacy website for conservation justice called Just Conservation (at 
www.justconservation.org), which continues to share observations and stories in which 
‘grievances, concerns or experiences of conservation related human rights abuses’ can be 
shared. If at the time, however, I had also had recourse to the theory of cognitive dissonance – 
and particularly to an understanding of how people (including myself) might resist 
disconfirming information – I think I would have been better equipped to understand the 
vigour with which narratives regarding the context I was researching were being policed.  
 
 
2. Managing dissonance through disavowal  
My second example of ‘dissonant sustainabilities’ focuses on the deployment of so-called 
biodiversity offsetting (BDO) to claim an apparent ‘no net loss’ of ‘biodiversity’, even though 
a measurable loss of individuals of species populations and habitats through development has 
taken place. This is arguably a dissonant proposition that permits damage to be sustained 
rather than significantly eliminated, and that requires ‘us’ to believe that no loss of 
biodiversity in aggregate has occurred, even though a loss has in fact taken place. To illustrate 
this paradox, let’s consider a couple of examples of how offsetting is being mobilised.  
 
The image in Fig. 4a shows the Gamsberg zinc mine owned by the Indian company Vedanta 
Zinc International, which is also listed on the London Stock Exchange (discussed further in 
Hannis and Sullivan 2018). The mine is located in the northern Cape Province of South 
Africa just south of the Orange River. The image below shows the recently completed access 
ramp, v-cut and the beginnings of a very large ‘waste rock pile’ built from the ‘overburden’ – 
i.e. the removed material forming the body of the mountain – that is excavated so as to be 
able to reach the ore below. The plateau behind will eventually be mined to depth, as shown 
in Fig. 4b.  
 
                                                
15 For example, a 2006 workshop on ‘Community-based conservation and protected areas in Africa: exertion of 
sanctions against “disobedient” knowledge producers’ co-organised with Hanne Svarstad and Tor Ave Benjaminsen at 
the then School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia; and a 2008 international three-day research 
workshop on ‘Problematizing neoliberal biodiversity conservation: displaced and disobedient knowledge’, co-
organised with Jim Igoe and Katja Neves in Washington DC. 
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Figure 4a. Aerial view of Gamsberg in mid-2017, showing recently completed access ramp, v-cut and the 
beginnings of a very large ‘waste rock pile’. The plateau behind will eventually all be mined to depth, as shown 
in Fig. 4b.  
 
 
Source: Moore 2017: online. 
 
Figure 4b. Vedanta slide showing the depth plan for the Gamsberg zinc mine. Mt stands for million tons. 
 
Source: Vedanta Zinc International 2018: online. 
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The Gamsberg mountain sits within the Succulent Karoo Biome, designated as one of the 
world’s 36 ‘biodiversity hotspots’. The name Gamsberg may derive from ‘||gams’, meaning 
‘water’ in the Khoe language of the Nama people who once lived there16. In the ravines of the 
mountain are two permanent springs, which are rare and important in this dry landscape. The 
pastures of the mountain plateau, described by a 19th century Cape government surveyor as 
‘excellent’, were used by Nama in centuries past as part of a longstanding system of 
transhumance, alongside highly seasonal grazing on the surrounding arid plains. As the Cape 
frontier expanded, farmers of European descent displaced the Nama and grazed their own 
cattle on the mountain (Moffat 2008[1858]). 
 
Vedanta’s mine will essentially hollow out this spectacular inselberg, which they 
acknowledge to be ‘the core of the Critical Biodiversity Area determined in the Namakwa 
District Bioregional Plan’. Direct biodiversity impacts, however, are to be ‘offset’ through 
enhanced conservation of allegedly similar habitats nearby, although these areas will 
themselves not necessarily be protected from future mining (Vedanta Zinc International 
2018).  
 
Biodiversity offsetting has also been a controversial element of conservation policy in 
England during the last few years (Sullivan and Hannis 2015). In this case, as elsewhere, a lot 
of attention is placed on the application and development of a scoring device (Table 1) for 
calculating harms that will be caused and the offset units needed so as to mitigate or offset 
these harms. Research into application of this metric indicates, however, that far from creating 
certainty in either biodiversity calculations or conservation outcomes, what unfolds is a 
proliferation of emphasis on finding the right numbers to go into the metric, and then on 
negotiating these numbers so as to find the amount of conservation that a developer might be 
happy to pay for (as shown in the empirical cases documented in Carver and Sullivan 2017 – 
see Table 2 below – and Sullivan and Hannis 2017). Meanwhile, the application of the metric 
seems to make it more possible for developments that might not have been permissible under 
previous planning requirements, to now become permissible.  
 
Table 1. Habitat scoring system for biodiversity offsetting in England.  
 
  Biodiversity distinctiveness 
  Low (2) Medium (4) High (6) 
Habitat 
condition 
Good (3) 6 12 18 
Moderate (2) 4 8 12 
Poor (1) 2 4 6 
Source: DEFRA, 2012: 7. 
                                                
16 Khoe presence in southwestern Africa, their encounters with Europeans and the dynamics of the colonial frontiers in 
the Cape of present-day South Africa and in the western areas of present-day Namibia are documented more fully in a 
timeline of historical references to southwestern Africa at https://www.futurepasts.net/timeline-to-kunene-from-the-
cape and mapped online here.  
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Table 2. Negotiated changes in calculated biodiversity baselines between Biodiversity Impact Assessments 
drafts 1 and 2, for an ethnographic case-study of a recently negotiated BDO contract in England.  
 
 
 
Source: Published in Carver and Sullivan 2017: 1063, drawing heavily on PhD field research by Carver. 
 
 
One way to understand how offsetting strategies manage the dissonance between 
environmental protection and impacts related to economic development is to see that 
offsetting offers the possibility of consonance by bringing in a new or third element that 
reconciles the dissonant elements. From this perspective a carbon or biodiversity offset 
permits dissonance to continue precisely by shifting attention to a new or third element, i.e. 
the offset. This situation is also resonant with the psychoanalytic concept of ‘disavowal’, as 
deployed recently by a number of authors considering how the dissonance created by 
environmental crisis is managed psychologically (Fletcher 2013; Weintrobe 2013). Freud’s 
original 1938 essay on ‘disavowal’ is helpful here (also see discussion in Sullivan 2017a). 
Entitled ‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence’, in this essay Freud asserts that in 
order to accommodate traumatic and dangerous reality the ego may behave in remarkable – he 
says artful – ways. In short, a defensive splitting can be effected such that the threat – or we 
might say the dissonance – associated with particular behaviours is both acknowledged and 
systematically turned away from. Attention becomes directed instead towards fetishised 
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solutions that mask, and thereby permit, continuation of the dangerous but satisfying 
behaviour. Freud uses the term ‘disavowal’ to describe this simultaneous and symptomatic 
defence against, and displaced acknowledgement, of traumatic reality (Freud, 2009[1938]). 
Disavowal thus becomes embodied in the fetishised substitute – in this case the offset – on to 
which value has been displaced or transferred.  
 
This, I think, is in part what we see in offsetting as a strategy for solving environmental 
problems. Through offsetting, the proliferation of attention, activity and technical and legal 
methods for creating offsets and offset exchanges (as documented in detail in, for example, 
Lohmann 2009, 2014; Lippert 2014; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013; Asiyanbi 2017) seems at 
the same time to reduce engagement with the causes of degradation underscoring the apparent 
need for offsets. We might say that the offset, and its chimerical promise of ‘no net loss’, or 
even ‘net gain’, deriving from loss, has become the fetishised substitute for facing and 
reducing the cause of pathology – as, indeed, is pointed out in many cartoons of this strategy 
(see Figure 5). The defense of the collective capitalist ego (if its possible to speak of such a 
thing) is thereby sustained precisely through deepening the rift between acknowledged danger 
and the substitute ‘solutions’ that mask this danger. Of course, the depoliticisation and 
‘rendering technical’ (after Murray Li 2007) of environmental degradation effected by 
calculative offsetting ‘solutions’, is a potent strategy for masking the exercise of 
capital/power, a dimension that provides insights into its promotion and defense (as 
emphasised in Bracking et al. in press). But given the extent of environmental crisis today, 
and specifically the decline of species and habitats globally (IPBES 2018), offsetting 
strategies also seem to me to be a defense against relational ecological realities that humanity 
can ill afford.  
 
Figure 5. A couple of the many cartoons capturing the dissonance at the heart of offsetting as a sustainability 
solution.  
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3. Capitalising dissonance 
For my third illustration, I want to briefly consider a set of green economy conservation and 
development proposals that seem in a sense to luxuriate in the propagation of dissonance. 
This is the promotion of conservation through blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, as 
I have discussed recently in a blog published on the Entitle Political Ecology Blog (see 
Sullivan 2018).  
 
Consumers are currently being solicited to invest in what is being framed as a US$120 trillion 
natural capital market whose value will be unlocked and sustained as blockchain technologies 
and cryptocurrencies transform the distribution and trading of ‘certified natural assets’. This, 
at least, is the promise of the Natural Asset Exchange (NAE) hosted at https://earthtoken.com, 
an emerging online platform established by Mauritius-based company impactChoice17 and 
offering efficient, transparent and democratic connections between producers, buyers and 
consumers of so-called natural capital assets18. The Natural Asset Exchange (NAE) capitalises 
on blockchain technology and the ‘digital gold’ of cryptocurrencies to change the world 
through the enhanced interactivity of Web 3.0. As with other market-based approaches to the 
distribution and management of environmental health and harm, the idea is to efficiently and 
securely connect certified producers of natural assets – those organisations creating positive 
and tradable environmental impacts – with consumers of these assets, via ‘EARTH tokens’ 
whose value will be determined by the market in which they are traded. Shorthanded simply 
to EARTH, these tokens can be purchased with two other cryptocurrencies, namely Bitcoin or 
‘Ether’, which is the currency associated with the ethereum blockchain platform. 
 
 
Figure 6. Crytocurrency tokens for Bitcoin (BTN), Ether (ETH) and ‘EARTH’. 
 
 
                                                
17 See http://impactchoice.com  
18 See Sullivan 2016b and 2017b for a fuller discussion of the creation of conserved and/or restored nature as a ‘natural 
capital’ ‘asset class’.  
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The technology behind the NAE is a combination of the distributed and minable ledger of a 
blockchain platform and the decentralised storage, ownership and movement of value through 
cryptocurrencies – encrypted digital assets that can be traded anonymously on the internet. 
Blockchains are numerical matrices stored and synchronised in multiple nodes in the 
computers of participating users. Like a synced google document with multiple editors, the 
blockchain makes it possible for transactions to be distributed and agreed across the web of 
nodes in the chain; as well as for value to potentially be ‘mined’ and accumulated through 
adding transaction records to the shared blockchain ledger (Goldsmith 2017).  
 
Cryptocurrencies permit the creation and transfer of digital assets that are verified and 
protected through encryption. The NAE makes use of Ethereum which provides both ‘an 
open-source, public, blockchain-based distributed computing platform featuring smart 
contract functionality’19 and a cryptocurrency token called ‘ether’ that can be used to 
purchase, and thus give value to, EARTH tokens. In a process that to the uninitiated seems 
something like alchemy, the combination of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies 
enables value to be ‘mined’ and accumulated, through verifying complex transactions 
calculated on the shared blockchain ledger. Cryptocurrency mining is receiving a lot of 
attention at the moment due to the spectacular volatility of bitcoin in the last few months.  
 
Echoing familiar ‘limits to growth’ concerns (Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows and Randers 
2004), the particular genius (or perhaps audacity) of the Natural Asset Exchange is to 
recognise that allocated EARTH tokens should appreciate in value due to the fixed supply of 
natural assets conferred by planetary limits (Steffen et al. 2015). This scarcity ‘in turn should 
lead to an increase in the market capitilisation [sic] of EARTH’, coupled with the flexibility 
to plug in future natural asset products not yet accounted as such (Lagrange 2017). A range of 
new natural capital asset classes are to be created, financed and traded via the NAE. These 
include black rhino conservation via the Black Rhino Reserve Trust fundraising site 
established by the owners of private lodges in Pilanesberg National Park in South Africa20, as 
well as voluntary carbon offset purchases21 from the Kariba REDD+ project in Zimbabwe22, 
validated and brokered through a Guernsey-registered company called Carbon Green 
Investment23. This latter integration of EARTH tokens with the controversial Kariba REDD+ 
project and colleagues is discussed in more detail by Lang (2018). 
 
EARTH tokens are not alone in the new world of conservation-by-cryptocurrency. In fact, 
however, the NAE is just one of several platforms creating cryptocurrencies linked with some 
putative and tradable natural capital value. Similar multiple-win promises are also being made 
for the trade of Earth Dollars24, for example, also powered by the Ethereum blockchain 
                                                
19 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethereum. 
20 See https://medium.com/earthtokens/partner-announcement-black-rhino-reserve-wildlife-trust-23e53fa48f73. 
21 See https://medium.com/earthtokens/kariba-redd-project-joins-earth-token-project-bbee24b072bd. 
22 See http://www.coderedd.org/redd-project-devs/carbon-green-investments-kariba-zimbabwe/. 
23 http://www.carbongreenafrica.net/  
24 See http://www.earthdollar.org/  
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platform. The Earth Dollar is claimed to be backed by pledged natural capital assets identified 
in this context as ‘fresh water, trees, fruit trees, carbon credits, mineral rights, artwork, real 
estate...etc’25. It is also claimed that value verification will be based on accounting 
methodologies such as those promoted by the UN and EU programme on The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (or TEEB)26 as well as by the Wealth Accounting and Valuation 
of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) system promoted by the World Bank27. These natural 
capital accounting initiatives are thus being mobilised in interesting and perhaps unintended 
ways to legitimate cryptocurrency natural capital financing strategies. 
 
At the heart of the promotion of such natural capital-backed currencies are claims made for 
the revolutionary distributed valuation of ‘natural assets’ via blockchain technology and 
cryptocurrencies. These claims are based in particular on the distributed holding of the 
blockchain by multiple participating and autonomous ‘nodes’. At the same time, a number of 
barriers, or at least gateways, control who is able to access and/or become a node in the chain. 
At the most basic level you need a computer, an email address, a mobile phone to which text-
messages containing verification codes can be sent, a photo ID, and, of course, money that 
can be directed to the purchase of the natural asset-backed cryptocurrency. For the purchase 
of the NAE’s EARTH Tokens specifically, you need access to either Bitcoin (BTN) or 
Ethereum’s currency Ether (ETH). Acquiring Ether is not as simple as a Paypal or 
Debit/Credit card transaction. Instead you need to buy via an online currency exchange like 
Coinbase, for which you have to set up a photo ID confirmed user account verified through a 
number sent to an account-linked mobile phone. 
 
The lowest amount that can currently be invested in the Natural Asset Exchange’s EARTH 
tokens is one Ether, which in January could be bought for around US $1,250 (up from $750 
only two weeks previously). In return, a purchaser receives 4,800 of a capped pre-sale of 1 
billion earth tokens. In order to make this purchase/investment you need to have a 
cryptocurrency wallet such as an Ethereum address to which your purchased Earth tokens will 
be sent. One way of acquiring an Ethereum address involves becoming a ‘node’ in the 
Ethereum blockchain. This in turn means downloading the full blockchain – currently around 
70GB of several million ‘blocks’ (depending on installation) – and permitting the node to 
sync regularly with the full distributed peer-to-peer blockchain. Significant bandwidth and 
hardware capacity are thus required, as well as a smattering of technical know-how, or at least 
an inclination to engage with digital-numerical instructions and techno-aesthetics. For those 
in rural and/or ‘under-developed’ contexts in the global south, which also happen to be 
primary locations for ‘natural capital assets’ such as carbon stored in tropical forests, the 
lingering digital divide means that equal participation in such a global exchange is a 
pipedream. 
 
                                                
25 See http://www.motherearth.network/  
26 See http://www.teebweb.org/ 
27 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment/brief/environmental-economics-natural-capital-accounting  
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Nonetheless, on 18 January 2018, when I last looked in detail, some 85,459,628 EARTH 
tokens had been allocated, i.e. purchased. At that time, one ether – equivalent to 4800 
EARTH tokens – was buying and selling for around $1050, meaning that current EARTH 
token purchases were worth almost $19 million. This is a figure that had risen by around $5 
million in the previous three weeks through the rise in value of ether alone. Although a far cry 
from the US$120 trillion claimed above for the ‘earth market’, this is still a dramatic claim for 
the creation and capture of ‘value’, particularly since the tokens being bought, sold and 
accumulated are themselves fictitious commodities that, as the Terms and Conditions of 
impactChoice make clear, may become useless and/or value-less due to technical, 
commercial, regulatory or any other reasons. Even so, and regardless of outcomes, for 
development of the NAE impactChoice claims a flat fee of 50% of any funds transferred to 
purchase EARTH tokens.  
 
These proposals link environmental sustainability via so-called natural capital asset 
management with a parallel world of currency creation and exchanges that is very opaque and 
inaccessible to many. Their claims for the positive environmental impacts they will generate 
also have something of a hollow ring when the energy usage of sustaining and synchronising 
multiple blockchain nodes is considered. For example, the massive computer technology 
behind Bitcoin has been calculated to use as much energy as Bulgaria, an industrialised 
country with a population of around 7 million (Hazas et al. 2017).  
  
Creating and accumulating cryptocurrency bubbles of value through appealing to the value of 
nature framed as natural capital is clearly consistent with speculative tendencies in an era of 
financialised neoliberalism (Konings 2018). But it does seem spectacularly dissonant with 
more conventional notions of environmental protection and the equitable distribution of 
value. Nonetheless, and judging by the posts on facebook and twitter, support for 
impactChoice and EARTH tokens appears to be proliferating. In this case, then, something 
that seems clearly to have demonstrable dissonance at its core is being amplified and 
intensified through its public and popular uptake.  
 
 
4. Some thoughts by way of a conclusion 
Overall, I have been asking what are the implications for us as political ecologists, ‘critical 
social scientists’ and environmental humanities scholars if we take dissonance and its 
(ideological) management to be at the heart of approaches to sustainability? In particular, will 
seeing dissonance as central to sustainability discourse assist with understanding both the 
antagonisms with which sustainability discourse is infused, and the frequent refusal of well-
intentioned analyses aiming to improve circumstances for both ‘the environment’ and ‘the 
disadvantaged’?   
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Following social psychologists such as Leon Festinger I have reflected on the implications of 
understanding that cognitive dissonance is a normal and everyday motivating force shaping 
peoples’ behaviours. I have suggested that this understanding might assist with being self-
aware about the behaviours and rationalisations one engages in so as to manage dissonance; 
as well as with understanding that aspects of other peoples’ strategies and behaviours, 
particularly those that might seem strange, are also perhaps associated with the management 
of dissonance. I have suggested further that the management of dissonance has an ideological 
component – i.e. if I believe that markets will solve market failures, then I am likely to 
propose and defend market-oriented solutions to allocation failures in societal and ecological 
arenas, even if there may be a weight of alternative evidence demonstrating that these 
solutions do not necessarily address the problems they are designed to address28. Indeed, I am 
likely to go further in actively suppressing or denying disconfirming evidence, sometimes 
cynically so. The same observation, of course, might also apply in reverse, and it is probable 
that blindspots will be present in our research through our own needs to manage dissonance.  
 
Being aware that the management of cognitive dissonance drives behaviours, however, might 
not necessarily help if what you are seeking is some kind of fixed and undeniable truth about 
the world. As I mentioned earlier, one of the more troubling aspects of the above discussion is 
a realisation that scientific enquiry and rational modes of empirical analysis will not 
necessarily lead to better outcomes. In fact, they may lead to worse outcomes, in part through 
the psychological and ideological work that people do to suppress disconfirming evidence – 
as we see in spades today through the ideological management of both climate change science 
in the US, and the suppression of the Brexit economic impact reports in the UK.  
 
What we are left with, then, are dilemmas of the recurring ethical and moral kind (cf. Gray 
2013: 75), amidst a heightened understanding of how human beings ‘struggle to change 
harmful habits, repetitive actions, or unhealthy preferences (path dependencies) even when 
they clearly recognize the negative consequences of inaction’ (Holm et al. 2015). I am 
referring here to the ‘Humanities for the Environment Manifesto’ by Poul Holm and 
colleagues, which suggests that the current ‘unprecedented crisis of how we as a species will 
cope with the consequences, not to mention responsibilities, of being the major driver of 
planetary change’ (p. 983) ‘might indeed be the biggest cognitive challenge to human 
intelligence in history’ (emphasis added). As they assert, it is crucial ‘to promote pro-
environmental behavior’. But, in ‘order to accomplish this, we need to move beyond rational 
choice and behavioral decision theories, which do not capture the full range of commitments, 
assumptions, imaginaries, and belief systems that drive those preferences and actions’. They 
therefore argue for a mobilisation for environmental concerns of ‘Humanities disciplines, 
such as philosophy, history, religious studies, gender studies, language and literary studies, 
psychology, and pedagogics [and I would also add anthropology] [that] do offer deep insights 
into human motivations, values, and choices’.  
                                                
28 On ideology and proposed solutions to environmental crises, see Sullivan 2017c. 
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The reflections I’ve offered here are intended as a contribution in this direction. In particular, 
becoming wiser – and perhaps more forgiving – about how we manage the drive to reduce 
cognitive dissonance seems essential for amplifying the intelligence now needed to support 
the civic, dialogic and governance actions required by the planetary ecological and societal 
changes we collectively face. 
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